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Abstract
The Rational Speech Acts (RSA) framework
has been applied to an increasing number of
linguistic phenomena. Despite its promise as
a model of conversational reasoning, it has
rarely been used to model more than a single
conversation turn. I propose a system for con-
versation update in the RSA framework that
allows iterative simulations of production and
comprehension. I explore three key issues:
how to simulate the Common Ground; how
to update the Common Ground and participant
belief states; and how to select observations.
1 Introduction
The Rational Speech Acts framework (RSA) (Frank
and Goodman, 2012) has been used to model an
increasing number of linguistic phenomena in re-
cent years.1 Bayesian approaches like the RSA
are based on three fundamental assumptions about
language users: (1) that they behave rationally;
(2) that they reason recursively about each other’s
behavior; and (3) that they adapt: they update their
linguistic models as they encounter new evidence.
Despite this last assumption, the RSA framework
has mainly been used to model a single conversa-
tion move: the production or interpretation of a
single utterance.2 Although intuitively, the pos-
terior distribution calculated by RSA models of
production and comprehension could be used to
update the conversation state, there is no existing
model of how this should be done.
∗Many thanks to Alex Göbel, Rodica Ivan, and the review-
ers of SCiL for their very helpful comments and suggestions.
1Among others, hyperbole (Kao et al., 2014); irony (Cohn-
Gordon and Bergen, 2019); politeness (Yoon et al., 2016);
implicature (Bergen et al., 2012; Degen et al., 2015; Potts
et al., 2016; Bergen et al., 2016); and social meaning (Cohn-
Gordon and Qing, 2018).
2Hawkins et al. (2015) model question and answer pairs;
Smith et al. (2013) and Brochhagen et al. (2016) simulate
word learning with multiple generations of learners.
I propose a system for conversation update in the
RSA framework that allows iterative application of
Bayesian reasoning in production and comprehen-
sion. I explore three key issues: (1) how to model
the Common Ground; (2) how to update the Com-
mon Ground and the beliefs of the conversation
participants; and (3) how to sample observations.
2 The Rational Speech Acts framework
The Rational Speech Acts model is a prag-
matic framework where speakers and listeners use
Bayesian inference to reason about each other’s
linguistic behavior. In production, the speaker sam-
ples a world to observe and reasons about which ut-
terance is most likely to communicate the world to
their listener. The speaker achieves this goal by sim-
ulating how the listener will interpret each potential
utterance. In comprehension, the listener’s goal is
to infer the observed world given the speaker’s ut-
terance. The listener reasons about the speaker’s
meaning by simulating their production process.
Although this recursive reasoning process is po-
tentially infinite, most RSA models focus on the
levels shown in Figure 1: the Pragmatic Listener,
the Pragmatic Speaker, and the Literal Listener.3
The Pragmatic Listener represents the actual
listener. Given an utterance, they reason about
the observed world using Bayes’ rule: they calcu-
late the utterance’s likelihood given each world,
p(u|w), using a mental model of the speaker (the
Pragmatic Speaker), discounted by their prior be-
lief in the world, p(w).
The Pragmatic Speaker serves as both the ac-
tual speaker and the listener’s mental model of the
speaker. The speaker samples a world and picks an
utterance based on its normalized utility, calculated
by a simplified mental model of the listener (the
3At each step, the probabilities are renormalized; I omit
the softmax terms from the model in Figure 1 for readability.
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Figure 1: Basic RSA model (Bergen et al., 2012)
Literal Listener). The more likely a listener is to
recover the speaker’s intended meaning from an
utterance, the higher its utility.
The Literal Listener reasons literally about the
speaker’s intended meaning. It calculates the pos-
terior probability p(w|u) by taking into account
the probability of the utterance given the world,
p(u|w), and the prior probability of the world,
p(w). Unlike the Pragmatic Listener, the Literal
Listener does not reason about the speaker, but
just assumes that an utterance’s probability given a
world is equal to its truth in that world.
3 Principles of conversation update
I take the goal of conversation to be information-
sharing (Lewis, 1979): participants pool their infor-
mation together in the Common Ground.4
I model an individual’s knowledge state as a dis-
tribution over worlds, where the probability of each
world reflects the participant’s degree of certainty
about whether the world is the actual one. Given
this representation, conversation is a process where
participants contribute information from their own
beliefs in order to reduce their shared uncertainty.
In the following sections I lay out some desired
characteristics of a conversation update system.
3.1 Cooperative contributions
One desired characteristic of a conversation up-
date system is that it should capture cooperative
behavior by participants. Grice (1975) lays out four
4As Coppock (2018) points out, this is not the only goal of
conversation. An alternative is perspective alignment (Fuchs,
2020): in this view, participants want the Common Ground
to mirror their beliefs. However, this view is less compatible
with the RSA framework, which assumes that speakers make
positive contributions (contributions increase the probability
of a world). I return to this alternative view in Section 8.
maxims that define cooperative behavior: Quan-
tity, Quality, Relation, and Manner. A cooperative
speaker is informative, clear, truthful, and relevant.
The existing RSA framework partially captures
cooperative behavior: relevant, truthful, and clear
utterances are preferred because they improve the
likelihood of the listener understanding the utter-
ance. However, the basic RSA model cannot guar-
antee true informativity, since it cannot assess the
novelty of information. A conversation update sys-
tem should prefer utterances that contribute new in-
formation, while maintaining the RSA’s preference
for true, relevant, and unambiguous utterances.
3.2 Common Ground development
The Common Ground represents the shared beliefs
of the conversation participants (Stalnaker, 2002).
I model the Common Ground as a distribution over
worlds reflecting the state of the conversation. Be-
cause the goal of conversation is to share informa-
tion, the Common Ground should become more
settled as the conversation proceeds. One way to
measure this is to calculate the entropy of the Com-
mon Ground: the average uncertainty about which
world is real. In a successful conversation, the
entropy of the Common Ground should decrease.
In addition, the Common Ground should re-
sist contradictions. Once an assertion has been
accepted into the Common Ground, participants
should resist later updates that would contradict it.
3.3 Belief consistency and convergence
In a successful conversation, participants are able
to learn from each other. This should lead their be-
liefs to become more similar (convergence). How-
ever, we do not always believe everything that we
are told: listeners should be less willing to be-
lieve claims when they contradict their own beliefs.
Thus, a model of conversation should allow par-
ticipants to update their beliefs based on how they
assess the information that has been shared.
4 Conversation update in the Rational
Speech Acts framework
In this section, I describe a basic model for con-
versation update in the RSA. I will model con-
versations with two participants, A and B, who
take turns. A conversation move consists of the
production or interpretation of a single utterance,
simulated as a single application of the basic RSA
model of production or comprehension.
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Set BelA and BelB
CG = Uniform(worlds)






Switch Speaker and Listener
end
Figure 2: Basic RSA conversation update model
In order to track multiple conversation moves,
we must represent the current state of the conversa-
tion: the Common Ground. Here we can build on
prior work: the Common Ground has been incor-
porated into previous RSA models (Goodman and
Stuhlmüller, 2013; Goodman and Lassiter, 2014;
Qing et al., 2016), though I will propose a different
formulation in Section 5.
The current speaker’s goal is to communicate a
possible world from among a set of candidates for
the real world.5 In order for participants to volun-
teer new information, we must also have represen-
tations of each of their private belief states, and a
method for selecting contributions from them.
In order to move a conversation forward, each
contribution must be used to update the conversa-
tion state. Minimally, this entails a mechanism for
updating the Common Ground. To model partici-
pants who learn from each other, it also entails a
mechanism for updating their private belief states.
The update process should take into account both
the previous state of the conversation and the new
information. I propose that the previous state is
updated with the posteriors from the basic RSA
model, discounted by a learning rate.6
The proposed conversation algorithm is shown
in Figure 2. In the next sections, I explore vari-
ous ways of implementing these components. To
illustrate how each component affects the model’s
predictions, I use example scenarios from the Mu-
tualFriends dataset (He et al., 2017). Each world
is a tuple of features of an individual, such as their
5As Qing et al. (2016) argues, this is equivalent to assum-
ing a maximal Question Under Discussion.
6As discussed by Qing and Franke (2015), an alternative
is to update only the probability of the world with the highest
probability according to the Pragmatic Listener.
Ina world: [Astronomy, Student, Indoors]
Katie world: [Astronomy, Student, Outdoors]
Nancy world: [German, Student, Outdoors]
Sally world: [German, Student, Indoors]










p(u|w) ∝ LitList(w, u)p(u)
Pragmatic Listener
p(w|u) ∝ PragSpeak(u,w)CG(w)
Figure 4: Shared Common Ground RSA
major and their location preference (Figure 3).
5 The Common Ground
The Common Ground represents the current state
of the conversation: the shared beliefs that the con-
versation participants have developed by pooling
information. The basic RSA model implicitly in-
corporates the Common Ground via the prior distri-
bution over worlds, shared between the speaker and
listener (Bohn et al., 2019). I develop this into an
explicit representation by creating separate distri-
butions for the Common Ground and for the private
beliefs of each conversation participant.
The Common Ground has been modeled explic-
itly in the RSA framework in previous work. Qing
et al. (2016) treat the Common Ground as a set
of worlds whose members can vary. In their sys-
tem, the Pragmatic Listener jointly reasons over the
Common Ground and the speaker’s intended mean-
ing; the posterior distribution over the Common
Ground represents uncertainty over its membership,
not over the probabilities of each world.
Treating the Common Ground as a set whose
members can vary is consistent with the update
by set intersection approach commonly used in
formal semantics. However, I pursue a different
approach: I represent the Common Ground as a
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Type A Belief B Belief CG
Figure 5: 4 moves with Shared Common Ground
full distribution over worlds and relax the assump-
tion that the world set is monotonically decreasing.
The advantage of this approach is that it allows the
Common Ground to be directly substituted in for
the world priors in the basic RSA model, allow-
ing the proposed conversation update system to be
easily adapted to any existing RSA model.7
5.1 A Shared Common Ground
Having created distributions to represent the partic-
ipants’ beliefs and the Common Ground, we can in-
corporate them into the RSA model. Conversation
participants cannot access each other’s beliefs, but
they can access each other’s public commitments:
the Common Ground. In production, the Pragmatic
Speaker can use the Common Ground as a model of
the listener’s prior beliefs. In comprehension, the
Pragmatic Listener can use the Common Ground in
its model of how the speaker samples observations
and its model of the speaker’s model of the lis-
tener.8 The Shared Common Ground RSA model
is shown in Figure 4.
5.1.1 Shared Common Ground results
The Shared Common Ground model allows us to
simulate how new information is incorporated into
the discourse context. First, consider a case where
A and B hold different beliefs. In the Mutual-
Friends dataset, a world is a person with certain
features (Figure 3). In this example, A thinks the
person is Nancy, while B thinks it is Katie.
As shown in Figure 5, the Common Ground is
initially uniform (empty), but begins to favor the
Nancy and Katie worlds as A and B share informa-
7It also allows discourse corrections to be modeled without
backtracking, since worlds can regain probability.
8Paralleling Goodman and Stuhlmüller (2013)’s informa-





p(u|w) ∝ LitList(w, u)p(u)






p(u|w) ∝ LitList(w, u)p(u)
Pragmatic Listener
p(w|u) ∝ PragSpeak(u,w)BL(w)
Figure 6: Approximate Common Ground RSA
tion.9 Thus, the Shared Common Ground meets the
most basic criteria of a conversation update model:
it tracks information across discourse turns.
5.2 Approximating the Common Ground
The Shared Common Ground model presented
above assumes that participants access a shared
representation of the Common Ground. While this
is a convenient assumption, it may not be realistic,
since it assumes that the listener is always suc-
cessful (always assigns highest probability to the
speaker’s intended world).
We can relax this assumption by using separate
Common Ground representations for each partici-
pant. The listener updates their Common Ground
(CGL) according to their Pragmatic Listener cal-
culation. The speaker runs a separate Pragmatic
Listener calculation to update their own Common
Ground (CGS). This also lets the listener use their
own beliefs in their Pragmatic Listener calculation
rather than the Common Ground. The Approximate
Common Ground model is presented in Figure 6.
5.2.1 Approximate Common Ground results
When the Common Ground is approximate, diver-
gence can arise when the listener’s prior beliefs dif-
fer from the Common Ground, leading to different
speaker and listener Pragmatic Listener outcomes.
For instance, in Figure 7, A believes strongly in
Nancy, while B begins with a uniform belief distri-
bution. After B’s first turn, A’s Common Ground
9I use a learning rate of 0.2; the details of the Common
Ground update will be discussed further in Section 6.
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Type A Belief A CG B Belief B CG
Figure 7: 4 moves with Approximate Common Ground
Set BelA and BelB
CG = Uniform(worlds)






postS = PragListS(u,CGS ,CGS)
CGS = UpdateCG(postS ,CGS ,lr)
BelL = UpdateB(BelL,CGL,postL)
Switch Speaker and Listener
end
Figure 8: Belief update conversation model
places more probability on Nancy than B’s Com-
mon Ground, because of A’s prior belief in Nancy.
6 Conversation update
In order to have a multi-turn model of conversation,
the output of the RSA production model must be
used to update the conversation state. I propose
a simple update mechanism: increment the prior
probabilities with the posteriors from the Pragmatic
Listener, discounted by a learning rate.
It is useful to apply a learning rate for several
reasons. First, the Pragmatic Listener calculations
can go wrong. Applying a learning rate limits the
impact of any one misinterpretation. Second, some
meanings are too complex to be conveyed in a sin-
gle turn. In these cases, it is useful to adopt some in-
formation from a single utterance, while preserving
some information from the previous distribution.
3A: They like being outdoors 4B: They like being outdoors





































Type A Belief A CG B Belief B CG
Figure 9: Belief updates (learning rate=0.2)
6.1 Belief updates
In Section 5, we saw how the Common Ground is
updated. But conversation is not just about advanc-
ing the conversation state: it is also about learning
new information. Figure 8 shows a conversation
update system that includes belief updates. After
calculating the posteriors via the RSA Pragmatic
Listener, the listener updates their own beliefs ac-
cording to the posteriors, discounted by a learning
rate. The speaker does not update their own beliefs,
since they have not gained new information.
6.1.1 Belief update results
To see how the belief updates work, let us return
to the scenario explored in Figure 7. Figure 9
shows how both the individual beliefs and the ap-
proximations of the Common Ground change over
the course of the conversation. Because B has no
strong beliefs of their own, their beliefs shift more
than those of A, who has a prior belief in Nancy.
Since the learning rate is fixed, B’s beliefs and
Common Ground remain very similar.
If both participants hold different strong views,
they will eventually become less certain of their
initial positions. If A starts out believing in Nancy
and B starts out believing in Katie, both Common
Grounds and sets of private beliefs will eventually
converge and assign equal probability to Nancy and
Katie. Figure 10 illustrates this. While the Com-
mon Ground of each participant still reflects a bias
towards their initial belief, it assigns high probabil-
ity to both Nancy and Katie, and each participant’s
belief in their initial choice has decreased.
6.2 Varying the learning rates
The learning rate can be adjusted to explore con-
versation dynamics. For instance, the learning rate
might be higher for the speaker’s Common Ground
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Type A Belief A CG B Belief B CG
Figure 10: Belief updating with informed speakers
(Top: lr=0.2, Bottom: speaker lr=0.2, listener lr=0.05)
update than the listener’s, since the speaker may
trust their own information more. A skeptical lis-
tener is shown in Figure 10 (bottom). Participants
may also be more willing to update the Common
Ground than their own beliefs; listeners sometimes
accept an assertion while privately disagreeing. A
lower learning rate for belief updates models this.10
6.3 Uncertainty-based updates
Because we have models of both the Common
Ground and the listener’s private beliefs, another
possibility is to allow larger updates when the lis-
tener’s uncertainty is high. A listener who is uncer-
tain may be more willing to learn from the speaker.
The current uncertainty of the Common Ground
and of the participants’ individual belief states can
be measured using entropy: when the entropy of
the listener’s belief distribution is high, they are
relatively undecided, and should be more willing
to learn from their conversation partner.
Figure 11 shows how setting individual learning
rates based on the uncertainty of each participant
allows uncertain participants to learn from more
certain ones. Since the entropy of A’s belief dis-
tribution is low, A’s belief updates are very small,
while B starts with a high-entropy belief distribu-
10A possible direction for extending existing RSA models
of politeness (Yoon et al., 2016, 2017).
tion and applies large belief updates.
7 Making observations
In Section 3, I discussed Grice’s Maxims as princi-
ples for cooperative speaker behavior that a model
of conversation update should strive to capture. The
basic RSA model captures these principles in a lim-
ited way: the Pragmatic Speaker is truthful and
informative in the sense of favoring true and infor-
mative utterances for a given world.
However, real speakers not only select utterances
to communicate, but decide what information to
prioritize. Thus, in a conversation update model,
we would like the speaker’s observation sampling
process to lead to cooperative contributions. In this
section, I explore different approaches to the issue
of observation selection.
7.1 Weighted sampling
In the simulations presented in Sections 5 and 6,
I used weighted selection: a meaning is sampled
from the speaker’s beliefs based on its probability.
Weighted sampling incorporates a pressure to-
wards truthfulness, since if a speaker assigns no
probability to a world, it will not be sampled. How-
ever, this bias towards truth is unintuitively weak
in the probabilistic belief system I have proposed.
Consider a speaker with no strong beliefs.
Weighted sampling will lead them to assert beliefs
at random, since all worlds are equally likely. This
works for a single turn, but since it triggers an up-
date to the Common Ground, it can cascade and
lead the Common Ground to flip-flop indefinitely.
This is shown in Figure 12, where A holds a
strong belief in Nancy, while B holds no strong
beliefs.11 Unfortunately, B samples Katie and pro-
duces an utterance contradicting A’s previous claim.
Contradictions are not always bad: A and B might
legitimately hold different opinions. But in this
case, it is just chance that B samples Katie. This is
undesirable: if the speaker holds no strong beliefs,
they should avoid committing to a stance.
7.1.1 Setting a belief threshold
One solution to this uncooperative behavior is to
use uncertainty-based updates, as in Section 6.3.
Another is to add a belief threshold to the sampling
algorithm. Instead of sampling worlds in propor-
tion to their probability, the thresholded sampler
filters out low-confidence worlds before sampling.
11I present results without belief updates for simplicity, but
the consequences are worse when this updates A’s beliefs.
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Type A Belief A CG B Belief B CG
Figure 11: Entropy-based update example
3A: They study a humanity 4B: They study a science





































Type A Belief A CG B Belief B CG
Figure 12: Sampling from a uniform belief distribution
leads to flipflopping in the Common Ground
If the speaker holds no strong beliefs, the thresh-
olded sampler may not return any world. To avoid
this, I introduce a null utterance:12 when the null
utterance is produced, all updates are skipped and
the Common Ground is not changed.
As Figure 13 shows, this improves the outcome
for the scenario discussed in the previous sec-
tion. Since B holds no beliefs with certainty above
threshold, they select the null utterance at each turn.
B’s utterances no longer cancel out A’s, and A’s be-
lief in Nancy propagates to the Common Ground.
7.2 Informative selection
The weighted sampler selects observations based
on their truth, but does not consider their informa-
tivity. But cooperative speakers do not just avoid
12Null utterances are independently motivated by previous
work as one solution to a kind of problem that can arise in RSA
inference. See Bergen et al. (2016) for further discussion.
3A: They like being outdoors 4B: NULL





































Type A Belief A CG B Belief B CG
Figure 13: A threshold lets noncommittal speakers pass
making false contributions: they also strive to make
useful ones. Participants may hold beliefs about
many aspects of the world: which are the most
important to communicate?
Informativity has two components: relevance
and non-redundancy. Since relevance has been ad-
dressed by previous work,13 I concentrate on redun-
dancy. To be non-redundant, a speaker should not
repeat previously shared information. This means
that an informative sampler must consider what
information is already in the Common Ground.
Consider the situation illustrated in Figure 14: B
believes that the individual is Katie, and A believes
that the individual could be either Nancy or Katie.
Since A’s prior for Katie is higher, the weighted
sampler is likely to select Katie on each of A’s turns.
This leads A to keep describing Katie, even though
13Relevance means relation to a Question Under Discussion
(Roberts, 1996), which previous work has added to the RSA
(Kao et al., 2014; Hawkins et al., 2015; Qing et al., 2016).
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Type A Belief A CG B Belief B CG
Figure 14: Redundancy with weighted sampling
the Common Ground already favors her.
7.2.1 Difference-based sampling
To incorporate awareness of the Common Ground,
I propose an difference-based sampler that
weights observations based on their potential to
contribute new information.
If the goal of conversation is knowledge sharing,
success means reducing uncertainty. Since uncer-
tainty is highest when the Common Ground is a
uniform distribution over worlds, the best obser-
vations are ones that increase the probability of a
world.14 A cooperative speaker should describe
the world with the highest update potential: the
largest (positive) difference in probability between
the speaker’s beliefs and the Common Ground. The
difference-based sampler weights worlds by this
positive probability difference.
In the scenario where A assigns high probability
to both Katie and Nancy, difference-based sam-
pling improves A’s ability to contribute their be-
liefs to the Common Ground (Figure 15). Initially,
A describes Katie, since her prior is higher. Once
Katie has been established as likely in the Common
Ground, A switches to describing Nancy.
Although difference-based sampling is intu-
itively appealing, its simplest form actually exac-
erbates the problem of noncommittal speakers dis-
cussed above. If the speaker has a uniform belief
distribution, the only worlds with positive prob-
14A reduction in probability is also informative. However,
because the RSA treats utterances as assertions that a world is
true, this is harder to model.
ability differences will be worlds that have been
decreased in probability by a previous utterance.
With naive difference-based sampling, a noncom-
mittal speaker no longer makes contributions at
random; they actively select for contradictions.
The solution is as before: we can set a thresh-
old to prevent noncommittal speakers from mak-
ing low-confidence observations. Thresholded
difference-based sampling leads informed speakers
to select utterances with the best update potential,
while allowing noncommittal speakers to pass.
8 Conclusion
I have presented a conversation update system for
the Rational Speech Acts framework. By providing
a way to simulate multi-turn conversations, it ex-
tends the range of phenomena that can be modeled
with the RSA. I hope it will aid future exploration
of phenomena that evolve during a discourse, such
as perspective prominence (Anderson and Dillon,
2019); adaptation (Schuster and Degen, 2020), and
social identity (Cohn-Gordon and Qing, 2018).
The proposed model successfully captures the
desired principles laid out in Section 3.
Truthful and informative contributions
For optimally cooperative behavior, the speaker
should select observations that lead to truthful and
informative contributions. To favor truthful con-
tributions, I introduced a thresholded observation
sampling method, which allows noncommittal par-
ticipants to pass. To favor informative observations,
I introduced difference-based sampling, which fa-
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Type A Belief A CG B Belief B CG
Figure 15: Thresholded difference-based sampling
vors worlds that will lead to a decrease in uncer-
tainty in the Common Ground.
Decreasing uncertainty, avoiding contradiction
Since each update to the Common Ground is based
on its prior state, the system shows how partic-
ipants cooperate in order to reduce their shared
uncertainty. However, the system also allows con-
tradictory updates. I have proposed two features to
mitigate this: adding a threshold to the observation
sampler to prevent participants from making low-
confidence observations, and setting the learning
rate based on the participant’s level of uncertainty.
These techniques help ensure that when contra-
dictions occur, they are due to real differences of
opinion between the participants.
Belief consistency and convergence
In order to model how participants learn from each
other, I have introduced belief updates: as informa-
tion is shared, participants incorporate it into their
beliefs. However, the system does not force partici-
pants to believe everything they are told: the update
takes into account their prior beliefs, and is dis-
counted by a learning rate, which can be adjusted
to reflect their degree of skepticism or uncertainty.
Challenges and Future Directions
I have presented approaches for producing coopera-
tive conversational behavior in the RSA framework.
However, the current RSA model may not lead to
optimal results, because of its assumption that the
speaker’s goal is to select the utterance that best
describes a single world. This suffices for the one-
turn scenarios common in RSA work, but it is too
narrow of an objective for multi-turn conversations.
If the goal of conversation is to share knowledge,
speakers should instead select utterances based on
their utility in minimizing the Common Ground’s
entropy.15 Reworking the RSA around this objec-
tive is a promising direction for future work.
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